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A city is liable for negligent acts of its servants and
agents when they are acting in a corporate proprietary or pri
vate capacity, and not liable when they are acting in a govern
mental or public capacity. This is the rule as generally stated
and the rule that prevails in a majority of the states. There
are two exceptions to· the rule that a city is not liable when
acting in a governmental capacity (1) when a nuisance is being
GOmmitted and (2) when the city has insurance to .cover the func
tion to the extent of such coverage.
These rules concerning municipal liability for corporate
or private duties and non-liability for governmental duties ire
elementary. The difficulty comes from the application. There
are some duties that are clearly private, and others that are
clearly governmental. It is the twilight zone that causes the
confusion.
In each case the question whether the town acted in a
governmenta1 or proprietary capacity must be decided upon its
own facts, and the purpose and character of the undertaking
determine. whether it is ·,:-.µblic or private .1
There is no sound basis on which to hold the city not liable
where it is acting in a governmental capacity. No doubt this
is largely responsible for the great confusion existing in the
''twilight zone. " This immunity dates back to an English case2
wherein there is supposed to be authority for the proposition
that a governmental unit is immune from suit. This is a mis
understanding of the case. The basis of decision in this in
stance was that there was no fund from which a judgment cbuld be
paid. An early Tennessee case3 stated:
"'l'he reason is that the
hazard of pecuniary loss might prevent the corporation from
assuming duties which, although not strictly corporate, not
ess ential to the corporate existence largely subserves the pub
lic interest. "
T

-

2
3

Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. app 274 ( 1949)
Russell v. Men of Devon County, 2 T. R. 667 (17 88)
Foster v. Water Company, 71 Tenn. 42

·'

PREFACE
In preparing this bulletin an examination has been
made of all the published opinions of Tennessee.

No attempt

has been made to cite all opinions because there is considerable duplication, especially in the decisions dealing with
street and sidewalk accidents.

An attempt, however, has been

made to cover all tort liability problems that have been
presented to the appellate courts of Tennessee,
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-2That this is a false premis.e is illustrated by the fact that
municipalities have continued to cons�ruct and maintain streets
despite the fact that the courts have declared this to be a pri
vate function.

- 3"In respect to their streets and sidewalks, cities like
counties, exercise a prerogative of sovereignty dele
gated by the State, and it was not originally considered
that they were liable for injury resulting from the
negligent condition.of streets and sidewalks. Now the
county as an arm or agency of the State is not liable
for the negligent maintenance of highways... Now in
all of the States, with the possible· exception of
South Carolina, municipal corporations are liable for
injuries that result from the negligent maintenance of
·
streets, sidewalks, and alleys.
Their liability rests
upon either an express statute or upon implied authority."
(It is submitted that the foregoing should be the correct view.)
Without statutory authority cities and
. counties should be on the
same footing. This, however, is not the �ituation. In the case
of Wood_ v. Tipton Countyll the court said:
"Within their prescribed spheres the counties legislate
for the public good, in respect to ordering the laying
out of roads, building bridges, and such other local
improvements as are for the public benef::\.. t, and author'�
ized by law. They are no more liable to be sued for
neglect of the duty of its officers than is th� State
for similar neglect of duty by its officers. The com
mon law gives no such a6tion, and it is therefore not
sustainable at all unless given by the statute."
The courts, however, were not consistent. In the case of
Mayor of Memphis v. Lasserl2 the city was being sued for in
juries sustained by a fall into a cistern in the street. In
finding liability the Court reasoned that:
"All the powers
conferred upon a corporation for the local government of a town
or city are, in judgment of law, for the private benefit of
such corporation, although the public at large may also bene
fit therefrom." This same reasoning would have applies! to
counties. In the Lasser case it was not necessary .i� apply
the reasoning referred to because the court found that a nuisance
was being maintained.
All decisions prior to _ City of Knoxville v. Felding_l3 finding
liability against municipalities for negligent construction and
maintenance of streets and sidewalks could have been justified on
the nuisance theory. A nuisance
in 1egal parlance, extends to everything that
endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses,
11

·

·

·

�-1�66 Tenn. 112 See also Lee
28 Tenn. 556 (1849)
153 Tenn. 586 (1925)

��

V.

Davidson County, 158 Tenn. 313

.·

Is there any test by which an harassed, frustrated city
official can determine whether a proposed function is going to
�e proprietary or governmentftl? The case o .f Nashvi��rans_1-_�
_
Company·v. Ci�y of _Nashvil]-_�� approves 38 Am. Jur . 271 which
collects �ases indicating the test to be whether the city has
undertaken work of a comm�rcial character from which it sought
to derive profit. A casual examination of the authorities,
however, will explode such' theory. No one would say tLat the
construction of city streets is "work of a commercial character"
yet from the earliest cases5 it has been the corporate re
sponsibility or the city to keep its streets in repair. Such
theory is .not consistent with the theory that operation of an
electric plant £or the sole purpose of li�hting streets and
municipal bui1dings is .a. pri'A'.te function.
Such a ruling, how
ever, could be based on the proposition that the function was
in competition with private industry. It is not necessary
that a profit actual·y be r.ealiz.ed in order for the function
to be propriet.a.ry.7. On the othe.r hand, an incidental charge
resu1ting in .a profit to the.. unic.ipali.t.y does not render the
�
service private or corporate.
Despite the fact that an ex
amination of tt� cases fails to d.isclose any hard and fast
rules that may be applied in .arriving at a conclusion as to
what is proprietary and what is governm�ntal, it is well to
examine the cases for the conclusion reached in each.
.

.•

�-the construction an2_ maintenance of streets truly a
proprietary function?
_There can be no question that such is the law in Tennessee
at the present time. The manner of arriving at such results,
however, is one of the most ambiguous and confusing chapters
in the annals of common law. That the confusion still exists
is manifest in the case of City of Knoxville v. Hargis9 when
the court said: "Of course the Common I.aw d·uty of the city
with respect to the maintenance of its streets and sidewalks
is limited to them... " It would appear that the court-here
has the opinion that the duty to construct and maintain streets
is a common law duty. 'I1his ls contrary to the court s opinion
in the case of City of Knoxville v. Felding_,10 wherein the court
said:
·

1

4 182 Tenn. 545 (1944)

5 State v. Bar.!csdale, 24 Tenn. 15lJ. ( 1844), Mayor of Memphis v.
J.as5er, 28 Tenn. 556 (1849), �� v. Ma:u_?r, 30 Ten:o-.. ?.r{ (18SO)
, Saulman. v. _Qit.Y.: o:f Nashville, 1 31 Tenn. 42'(
·
Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274 (1949)
Na�!lvil le Trust Co_. v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. -51+5 (1944)
9 184 Tenn. 262 (1946)
10 153 Tenn. 586 (1925)
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of those of the common law are n g to be exte�ded beyond the
�
cases prescribed by the statute.
It, therefore, follows that
the Courts in order to be consistent would have found no lia
bility in the Felding Case.

-·

This inconsistenc! continues in ?ther cases. In Shepherd
of Chattanooga 7 the court said:
City
v.
"So in Conelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. ?62, 46 S. W. 565,
the act of spr.inkling a street was held to be a govern
mental task bY- .refer.ring it to· the charter power ·to preserve
the general health of the
community rather than to the
.
power to open, alter and repair streets. "
Under the reasoning in the Lasser Case18 there would not
be this distinction. This .confusion continues with the examina
tion of other cases. A. city was held .liable �or injury caused
by a dead horse in the street,19 the theory of liability being
that cities hold their streets in a proprietary capacity. The
decision, however,.could easily have gone .the other way n the
8
basis that cle.aning streets is a governmental function, 2 or
that the ��gulatlon of the use of streets is a governmental
function.
In this . case, the court said:
"The marn1er ·in_ which the streets should be used, however,
calls for the exercise of municipal discretion, a govern
mental power, and a municipality cannot be called to ac
count respecting its employment of such a power. "
Would a policeman .directing the removal of an obstruction
from a street be acting in the capacity of policeman or super
intendent of streets? In the case of Jackso_!!_V. Cit[
1 of· Paris21a
the policeman discovered a long wire attached to a truck. He
stopped the truck and. removed .the wire, placing it in the gutter.
He called the street superintendent and found that he was out
of town. The policeman then called two city employees and directed
them to remove the wire. In th� process one of these employees
received serious injuries. The court found no liability on the
ground that the policeman was acting in a governmental capacity
in ordering the wire removed from the street. Logically this
case is· in conflict with the Shepherd Case22 because it could be
argued that the policeman was�erely acting as an official of
the city in employing a person to remove an obstruction from
the street. In the Shepherd Case the Court said:
16
17
18
19
20
21

M'Crea v. Galey_, 1 Tenn. 251; Hearn v. Pendelton, 43 'renn. 399
168 Tenn. 153 (1934)
Memphis v. Lasser, 28 Tenn. 756
Nashville v. Feriilizer Co. , 127 Tenn. 107 (1912)
Hale v. City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491 ( 1949)
Town of Gainesboro v. Gore, 131 Tenn. 35 (191��)
21a33 Tenn. App.
55(1949)22 Shepherd v. Q1ty of C�attanooga, 168 Tenn. 153

-·4violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reason
able and comfortable use of propertyA Anything which
renders a public highway unsafe rrir travelers thereon
is a nuisance. (citing cases). +
11

The Feiding Case, however, presented a new situat�o�. An em
ployee '·1erf- the· city engaged in the construct.ion of a street was
·injured by a pie�� o.f steel flying from a hammer bein� wielded
by a fellow employee. In order to uphold a recovery in this
case the Court deemed it necessary to find statutory authority
for the proposition that .construction of streets by a munici
pality is a proprdetary function. T�e ����t said:
11The rigid application of statutes that require
notice as a condition precedent to suit against
the city, and the precision exacted as to time,
place and nature of the injury, cannot be justi
fied except upon the ground that originally the
law forbade a recovery ... "
The statute referred to is Chapter 55, Public Acts 1913 which
reads as follows:
" No suit shall be brought against any municipal
corporation, on account of injuries received by
person or property on account of the negligent con
dition of any street, alley, sidewalk, or highway of
such municipality unless within ninety days after such·
injury to the person or property has been inflicted�
a written notice shall be served upon the mayor or
manager of said municipality, stating the time and
place where said injury was received and the general
nature of injury inflicted. The failure to give the
notice prescribed in this section, within the time
set out, shall be fi valid defense against any liability
of the municipa·;1.:ll"�U which might otherwise exist on
account of t;he de 'fe·ctive or negligent condition of
said streeJq, ,:f11ley, sidewalk, or highway; and provid.ed,
further, that proof of registered letter by registry
receipt addressed to the mayor or manager setting Torth
the injury and place of injury complained 6f shall .be
a complete compliance with this secti'on.
11

Prior to the 1913 statute no action for negligence in the
construction and maintenance of streets had been brought against
a municipality that could not be prosecuted under the nuisance
doctrine. Statutes in derogation of common law are strictly
construed,15 and modes of proceeding under statute in derogation
14 Yarbrough v. L & N RR Co., 11 Tenn. App. 456
15 Baker v. Dew, 133 Tenn. l26, and cases cited therein.
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-6it seems to us to follow logically and necessarily
"
that in the selection and use of the physical means and
agencies by which this obligation is to be performed
the municipality is likewise acting in its corporate
capacity. "
This case in turn is in direct conflict with another case. 23 That
case involved a waterworks, which function had previously been
held to be a proprietary .runction.24 Nevertheless, the Court in
the Smtldy Case said:
"The operati�n of a water plant being a governmental function
upon all of the authorities, we think it equally clear that
the decision to employ persons to operate it, as well as the
fixing of their salaries, is also a governmental duty."
One could assume that this quotation was a mistake and the court
intended the words "water plant " to read "fire department " because
the case ·involved employees o'r a fire department. In a subsequent
case,25 however, the statemen� was referred to with approval.
A city is liable for patent defects in sidewalks and streets
that result in injury26 unless the defect is the result of a plan
adopted by the city27 which is not dangerous as a matter of law.28
Ordinarily the city is not liable for a dangerous conditton of the
streets or sidewalks resulting from natural causes such as snow
and ice even though the cit� in attempting to clear away snow con
tributes to the condition.29 There may be liability, however, if
the snow and ice is allowed to accumulate to the extent 8f creating
a nuisance and there is an affirmative duty to inspect. 3
The court
in this case said:
"The duty of the municipality to use ordinary care in
keeping its streets in a safe condition for public tra
vel involves the inspection of defects that are the
natural and ordinary result of climatic influence. "
23 ·.§midd_l v. City of Memphis 140 Tenn. 97

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Saulman v. Nashv11le, 131 Tenn. 427
Yarbrough v. L&N RR C_?...:..�· 11 Tenn. App. 456
Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 448, 93 Tenn. 62
Clrty of NashVUle v. Brown., 25 Tenn. App. 34
Swain v. City of Nashville, 170 Tenn. 99
Hale v. City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491
Cit_x of Nashville v. Nevin, 12 Tenn. App. 336

-7This does not mean that a city warrants its sidewalks to be safe,
but is liable for any damage caused by defective wal.ks, which it
knew or might have l<:n.own by exercise of reasonable care, to be
defective. 31 The condition c�eating the defect may have been
created by the abuttjng property owner. Nevertheless the city is
jointly liable where it has actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition and does nothing'to abate it. 32 The city has
the duty to inspect and actual notice is.�ot necessary.33
The obligation to keep sidewalks and streets in repair is a
primary one. By statute34 property ow�e�� may be made jointly
liable by cities authorized so to do, or by notice to the property
owner at least five days before the accident the liability may
be passed to the property owners.35 An ordinance, however, requir
ing abutting property owners to keep.walks in repair does not im
pose liability on owner:lbr injuries.36 The primary liability of
the city is not shifted by statute or ordinance.37 In other words
an injured party may elect whether to sue the city or the property
owner.
We have been discussing liability for injury to persons caused
by d�fective construction and maintenance of walks and streets.
Municipalities are also liable for injuries to property. A city
cannot lawfully cut ditches and canals so as to empty the water
from ponds in such a manner as to flood private property without
being liable.38 By statute39 a city is liable for damages caused
by a change in the grade of a street.40 The change in rade need
�
This
not be on the same side of the street as the property.4
liability holds even though the grading is done by a third person
without the regular or formal consent of the city.42
By statute43 a person bringing suit for injuries received on
account of negligent condition of any street, alley, sidewalk or
highway must give written notice to the mayor or manager stating
place of injury and desoriping extent of injury. The location of
31 Brown v. C1-t¥ of Chattanoo�? .. 180 Tenn. 284 (194 3)

32 Osbor.n ·e- fal v. City of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197 (1944)
33 City of Clarksville v. Deason, 9 Tenn. App. 274 (1928)
34 Williams Tennessee Code-:-annotated Section 3402
35 Id. Section 340 3
36 Vinson v. Fentress, 3 Tenn. App. 359 (1950)
37 Harbin v. Smith, 168 Tenn. 112, City of Knoxville v. Fer��
241 �.w. 2d 612 (1951)
3 Burton v. Chattanooga, 75 Tenn. 739, Dixon et al v. City_gf
Nashville, 29 Tenn. App. 282 (1946)
39williams, Code annotated, Section 3401�
40 _9hattanooga v. Geiler, 81 Tenn. 611, Graz. v. Knoxville., 85 Tenn. c:!9
41 City of Knoxvill� v. Phillips� 162 Tenn. 28 (19 0)
3
3
42 �ity of Knox��lle v. Bunt, 156 Tenn. 7 (1927J,
43 Williams Code�-:-annotated, Sec. 8596
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-9·opeJ;"at,ing a swimming pool. This pcol is patronized by many people
not residents of the city and actually operates at a small profit
or, at least ,, does not require the expenditure of any public funds.
Yet this operation was held to be a governmental function and the
city would not be liable for the negligent oper�tion thereof. A
nuisance, however" may be created in connection with the operation
thereof. A nuisance however.• may be created in connection with
the operation of a swimming pool by permitting the drainage from
the pool and the showers to gather in pools that .s
' erve as a breed-·
ing place for mosquitoes and which give o.ff ol'f'ensive odors. The
city becomes liable for such nuisance.
.

•

the place must be definite. 44 Such notice, however, is not re
quired if the city committed the act which caused the injury,45
or if a contractor failed to g�ard or give warriing of an excava
tion. 46 The notice must b� explicit,4'( and must be served on the
proper official,48 and must be giveri prior to instituting suit.49
Other Activities Which Have

:1

By statute56 the operation of airports is made a governmental
function. The constitutionality of this act has been sustainea.57
In this case it was found that a wire placed to protect a grass
plot did not constitute a nuisanee.58 Enforcing punitive ordi
nances is a governmental. function .. 59
The operation of' the jail and the working of prisoners to pay
oi.'f .fines is a govermnent?-1 function.60 The operati.on of a park is
a governmental i'unction.9 61 however, the city is liable for a nuisance,
created in connection therewith.62
Building a sewer is a governmental ..function. rrhe construction
however is not to be done in. a negligent manQer.63 Leayi
dynag�
mite cap lying around constitutes an attractive nuisance.
It
is a question .for the jury as to whethe.r a catch basin is a nuisance.65
Discha e of ·sewerage near p:civate property may constitute a nui
g�
sance.
� sewer overflowing onto private prope ty constitutes a
5
nuisance· and renders the city liable to damages. 7 Closely allied
with sewage disposal is the collection of garbage, which is also a
governmental function, an� a city is not liable for negligence unless a nuisance is created.68 An affirmative act of the city is
required to create a nuisance.69
---·· 50-Chapter 116, Public Acts 1933
5
oC�E;_!:_ V. Q_!.�l..-�f Nasl!Y.�-���- " 1'{1� Tenn. 483
5 � e.�
·
;?t.Q.Cke?:_ V Qit;y_£_:[_!:!£�t1v1:lle,, 174 r .rerm. 1+83
59 Qity of Knoxville et al v. Hargis, 184 Tenn. 263 (1946)
Hale v. Ci_ty of Kn9xyJ;.:iTe;-189 Tenn:- 491-··
..
60 HowarQ_ v. 2-�!iz· o� Cha.�t�:Q_oo_g� 170 Tenn. 663 (1936)
L
61 !'jayor2nd -�-�!L coun£1t. v. Burns,
131 Tenn .. 281 ( 1915)
62 �ohnsori :. v. !:�E!.l_��s�a�� ·�wspape .r, _!!:le. 192 Tenn. 287 ( 1950)
.
63 Nashville
v. Sutherland Co. 91+ Tenn. 356
61+ verran v. Tow'Q._of Greene�il1�_, 4 1renn. App. 422 ( 1927)
65 City ?.! K.t,:10xvi�le_ v. Campte_E,, 21 Tenn. App. 210 ( 1937)
66 Chatt.§:_noog.,:_� v �owling,., 101 Tenn. 342
6'( Nes�ville v. C£rna:z..9 88 Tenn. 415
.
68 Cit;y of !i��hviJ:.:!�, v .. �.��.£!.!:, 13'"( 'renn. 169 ( 1916)
.
69 �.2Xd .i:!. \!:�. v. CitY. of' ..K�i].le, Y(l 'renn. 401 (193r()
•

--:-·

.--·

__

•

__

.

Been Considered Propri.etar:;y or Private in Nature
There are many othe� activities of �unicipalities which are
considered proprietary and for which cities have been held liable
gligence in the performance of such functions. In an early
for
g0
case
a steamboat coming into a city operated wharf hit a cylin
.
der which had been on the dock for several months, but which was
submerged at the ti'me. The operation of the wharf was held to be
a proprietary function.
The operation of a water works system for "profit" means the
system is being conducted on a commercial basis for revenue and not
as a governmental enterprise even though no profit is realized in
the operation thereor.5 1 The operation o� a market house is a
proprietary function agg the city is liable for injury caused by
a defect in the floor.�
The operation of a power plant is a
53
private function.
Licensing ordinarily would be a public opera
tion. The city, however, was held accountable for licensing a
lunatic as a druggist.54
Cit;y fun·ctions_ which_ have . been . considered.. governmental in
nature !_ .. .§ind. for _which .city is .not . liable even though n�g-·
In the case of .VaughaQ v. City of Alcoa55 the city was engaged in
.
44 City
of Knoxville _Y...'.. BYanL_.13 �enn. App. 186, Gidcome et al.
v. � of Nashville, 177 Tenn. 295 (1940)
1+5 Sneed v.. City of Memphis,! _6 Tenn. App" (1927) Hood v. Allen
190 Tenn. 56 (1950)
Hughes v. City of Nashville� �37 Tenn. 177 (1916)
r City of Knoxville_'v,. RyanJ. 18 Tenn. App. 186
48 Avant v. City of Memphis, 18 Tenn. App. 362
49 Gelky v. CitL_of Memphis, 159 Tenn. 220
�O Memphis v-�imbro�h, 59- Tenn. 133
� l Williams v.-T'O-wrlof-Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274 (1949)
'
�2 City of Nashville .v. Fox, 6 Tinn. App. 653
53 City of Lawrenceburg V:-_Q�, 11 Tenn. App. 493 (1929) Null v.
Electric...Power Bqard of the City of Nashville, 30 Tenn. App. 696 '(1948)
--:;4 Cole v. Nashville, 36 Tenn. 162
55 June 7' 1952 not yet
0 reported
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-11Governmental immunity extends to tpe operation of a hospital
and generally speaking a cit� i� not liable for the negligence of
officers and employees of such institutions. � O
The operation of a cemetery is a governmental function. Bl

Adopting, installing, equipping and operating a fire depart
ment is a governmental function;70 · Eitinguishing fires i�? a
public and not a corporate one and the city is not liable for
negligence of the fire department in responding to . a ca11. 71 The
installation and operation of a fire alarm system is a govern
mental function.7 2 Supplying water to a sprinkler system is a
governmental function, and in this regard the city acts in a
dual capacity. 73
·

In order to answer this question several things must be taken
into consideration.
( 1) ··-·Would the �&. officials _be_�uthorized to __ spend money for
this purpO"se? We have .found no case directly in poigt in · Tertnessee
or any other state. There i�, however, in one state 2 dicta to the
effect that such expenditure would not be legal. In that case the
court made this observation:
__

..

____

"It is tl).e settled law of this state that a mtlnicipal
corporation is not liable for negligence in the per
formance o.f a governmental . functio
. n. Under any ordi-·
nary circumstances, for it to compensate one injured
by such negligence mignt ·welLi:'be- 1to use public funds and
impose a burden upon its taxpayers for an unlawful, pur
pose which it has no right to do. (citing cases) .. . It
was stated in oral argument that the city was insured
against liability of this nature, but, if so, that would
almost of necessity mean the use of money of the city
to pay premiums for such insurance, which would be open
to ·the suggestion we have stated. . .
''

The questi6n has not been raised in Tennessee. Consistent reason
ing, however, would necessitate this concl�sion. In Nashville v.
Sutherland Co. 83 the city attempted to contract for the construc
tion of a sewer line. Subsequently water backed up and injured
the company's property. The city was not liable for negligent
construction of the
wer line. This case, the case of Blapk
g4
v. City of . Co·lumbia,
and the ca:.:ae of Van Horn v. Des Moines-85
are quoted with approval in the case of Nashville Trust Co. v.
80

Lane v. City of
81 Town of Pulaski
Lambert v. City
92 Tenn. 335
84 19 S.C. 412, 45
85 63· Iowa 44
7

��
•

Knoxville, 170 Tenn. 482 (1936)
v. ·Ballentine, 153 Tenn. 393 (1925)
of New Haven, 129 Conn. 647 304, 2d. 923
Am. Rep. 7 85

It is not a nuisance to operate a fire truck at a speed where
it was the custom to throw �ignal lights and to sound a siren, and
negligence in the operation of the signal system does not render
the city liable.7 4
Police activities come within the category of governmental
functions. 75 In commenting on this matter the court in the case
of Davis v. Knoxville7 6 said:
"However difficult it may be in some instances to deter-..
mine whether a particular act or duty falls within ihe
general governmental or public powers of the corporation,
or pertains to its purely local and special side, yet in
the case under consideration there can be no doubt but that
the acts complained of fall within the general or public
functions of the city of Knoxville. The preservation of
order, the maintenance of sobriety, the arrest and de
tention of violators. . .is not for the local and private
benefit ·of the corporation. "
This non liability for the wrongful acts of a policeman in �aking
an arrest77 continues even though it is known to the officials of
the city that a policeman is insane and dangerous.78 A city may
becom
if the act
· e liable for the personal tort of a policeman
'
was sanctioned by the city officials. 79
7 0 Smiddy v. Me!!!P-his, 140 Tenn. 97 (1918) , Irvi_!2� v. Ch?tto.nooga
101 Tenn. 291
71 Irvine v. Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291 (1898)
Gorman v. Mayor and Aldermen, 2 Civ. App. 551 (1910)
NaBhville Trust Co. v. City _of Nashville, 182 Tenn. 545 (1944)
7 4 Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238 .(1932)
75 Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205, Chavin v. Malor and Cit¥
Council, 1 Civ. App. 317
76"90 Tenn. 599
77 .Qombs v. Ci1l._Qf Elizabethtotl, 161 Ten:.1. 363
O'Qu nn v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570 (1947)
g
Bobo v. Cit;y_of Kenton, 186 Tenn. 515 (1948)
9 Johnson City v. Woife, 103 Tenn. 2
77
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City of ..:.Nashville�6 where the court said�

In the absence of charter authority it seems advisable
for municipalities to refr�in f�6m spending money to purchase
liability insurance to cover governmental activities. The un
certainties surrounding this phase of municipal law point up
the need for general legislation that will permit a city that
so desires to spend money for this p�rpose and to limit lia
bility to the amount of coverage, and legalize the contractuai
agreements of insurance companies not to plead governmental
immunity.

11Under these authorities a city cannot assume iiability
for negligence in cases where the law relieves it of
liability. In other words, a city is without power to
enter into a contract rendering it liable for the neg
ligence of its servants in the exercise of a governmental
function. "
It logically follows that if a city has no authority to waive govern
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been enforced against the insurance company. In the case of Rogers
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In the case of. City of Kingsport v. Lane89 it was ··held that the
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